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ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS AS HARASSMENT:
THE THREAT TO FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTED SPEECH IN THE
AFTERMATH OF DOE V. REED
Elian Dashev*
The recent U.S. Supreme Court case of Doe v. Reed called into
question the effectiveness and, potentially, the legitimacy of the
economic boycott as a tool to counteract the influence of Major
Political Players in the electoral process—despite the protection that
such boycotts have been afforded historically under the First
Amendment. The holding in the case was very narrow: the Court
deemed constitutional as a general matter the compelled disclosure of
the names of the supporters of a referendum. However, in dicta, the
Court acknowledged that disclosure could be subject to an as-applied
challenge if there were a reasonable probability that disclosure would
subject the signatories to “threats, harassment, or reprisals.” Indeed,
included in the plaintiffs’ allegations of retaliation was a fear of
economic boycotts. This Note argues that the Court should not allow
Major Political Players to use economic boycotts, whether threatened
or actual, as a justification for exemptions from disclosure
requirements in as-applied challenges. To do so would undermine the
fundamental First Amendment goals that are critical to our democracy
and that outweigh any competing claims of harassment.
First, this Note illustrates how the economic boycott has
increasingly become an effective and popular weapon in the arsenal of
dissent to counteract the political influence of individuals, large
corporations, special interest groups, and issue-based organizations
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Pennsylvania. I am extremely grateful to Professor Rick Hasen for his invaluable mentorship and
support throughout the development of this Note. His thoughtful contributions infinitely
strengthened this piece. I would also like to thank Associate Professor Justin Levitt for his time
and insight, especially early on; Joshua Rich; and the entire Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
team for their comments and suggestions. And finally, a very special thanks to my Mom and Dad
for their unwavering encouragement, love, and patience.
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that have access to large accumulations of wealth. Then, this Note
reviews key Court rulings on the economic boycott as a protected First
Amendment activity and on the establishment of the as-applied
challenge and the harassment exemption. It also looks at the existing
tension between the Court’s embrace of compelled disclosure and the
Court’s protection of anonymous speech. This Note then examines the
various opinions in Doe v. Reed and their potential to undermine the
speech protection of economic boycotts in the context of elections. It
considers how these opinions could have the effect of silencing speech
and erecting barriers to dissent, and suggests that Major Political
Players should not have the right to seek the protection from disclosure
that is intended for politically persecuted groups. Finally, this Note
argues that economic boycotts advance the core democratic and First
Amendment values of truth-seeking and dissent and, in so doing, trump
any disclosure exemptions that Major Political Players may claim.

Fall 2011]

ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS AS HARASSMENT

209

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................210
II. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT AND THE
HARASSMENT EXCEPTION ......................................................214
A. The Economic Boycott as Protected First Amendment
Activity............................................................................215
B. Precursors to the As-Applied Challenge: The Rights to
Private Association and Anonymous Speech..................216
C. Protecting Minor Parties: Buckley’s Reasonable
Probability Test and the Socialist Workers’ Party
Exception ........................................................................218
D. The Conflict Between Anonymous Speech and
Compelled Disclosure in the Electoral Process ..............220
III. DOE V. REED: THE THREAT TO THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT AS
PROTECTED FIRST AMENDMENT ACTIVITY IN THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS .............................................................223
A. The Decision in Doe v. Reed: A Facial Challenge..........224
B. The Various Opinions in Doe: Perspectives on the AsApplied Challenge...........................................................226
1. The Economic Boycott as Harassment: The Threat
to “Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide-Open” Debate ...227
2. The Threat to an Informed Electorate:
Strengthening Legal Barriers to Dissent....................230
3. The Co-option of the Minor Party Interest by
Major Political Players ..............................................233
IV. THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT AS “PROPER LEGAL MEANS”:
WHY ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
HARASSMENT IN CLAIMS FOR AS-APPLIED EXEMPTIONS .......236
A. The Economic Boycott in the Marketplace of Ideas .......238
B. Dissent and First Amendment Protection: Speaking
Truth to Power ................................................................242
C. Balancing the Equities .....................................................247
V. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................252

210

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:207

“Acceptance of a right to boycott as a political act must
entail the rejection of the right to be free of political
consumer boycotts.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
On the morning of October 21, 2010, word began to spread that
American Crossroads, the conservative political action committee
(PAC) founded by Republican heavyweights Karl Rove and Ed
Gillespie, had raised $23 million in its first seven months of
operation leading up to the 2010 midterm elections.2 One of the
disclosed donors was billionaire Robert Rowling, chief executive
officer of TRT Holdings, the parent company of Gold’s Gym, and a
known supporter of anti-gay politicians.3 The filings revealed that
Mr. Rowling had made contributions totaling more than $2 million
from his corporate and personal accounts.4 Four days later, on
October 25, four Gold’s Gym franchises in San Francisco, a city
known to have a large and politically active gay population,
announced their decision to sever their twenty-two-year partnership
with the brand5 after more than two thousand people signed an online
petition to the head of public relations for Gold’s Gym condemning
Rowling’s actions and demanding an official response from the
chain.6

1. Michael C. Harper, The Consumer’s Emerging Right to Boycott: NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware and Its Implications for American Labor Law, 93 YALE L.J. 409, 424–25 (1984). The
article suggests that “boycotts aimed solely at private decisionmaking should share the status of
other political acts such as electoral voting, contributing money and time to an election or
referendum campaign.” Id. at 422.
2. Jeanne Cummings, Texas Builder Gives Crossroads $7M, POLITICO (Oct. 20, 2010,
8:53PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1010/43937.html; Lucy Madison, Texas Builder
Bob Perry Gave $7 Million to American Crossroads, Reports Show, CBS NEWS (Oct. 21, 2010,
12:39 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20020320-503544.html?tag=content
Main;contentBody.
3. Cummings, supra note 2; Madison, supra note 2.
4. Cummings, supra note 2.
5. Justin Elliot, Donations to Rove-Tied Group Sparks Gold’s Gym Revolt, SALON.COM
(Oct. 25, 2010, 2:19 PM), http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/2010/10/25/san_
francisco_gold_s_american_crossroads.
6. Michael Jones, Tell Gold’s Gym: Stop Supporting Anti-gay Politicians, CHANGE.ORG
(Oct. 25,
2010),
http://www.change.org/petitions/tell-golds-gym-stop-supporting-anti-gaypoliticians.
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Just a few months earlier, Target stores were themselves the
targets of similar movements after the company disclosed that it had
donated $150,000 to anti-gay politicians via MN Forward, a
conservative pro-business PAC based in Minnesota and heavily
backed by corporate donors.7 Despite a public statement from
Target’s Chief Executive Officer, Gregg Steinhafel, describing the
brand’s support for the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transsexual
community as “unwavering,”8 protests and online movements
surged, urging Target customers to express their criticism and
disapproval of the donation by boycotting Target stores.9 In a weekly
report published by Brandweek, a trade magazine on marketing and
branding, the author noted that Target had lost one-third of its “buzz
score”10 over the following weeks.11
The economic boycott, which the U.S. Supreme court has long
considered protected First Amendment activity,12 has increasingly
become an effective and popular weapon in the arsenal of dissent to
counteract the political influence of individuals, large corporations,
special interest groups, and issue-based organizations with access to
large accumulations of wealth (“Major Political Players”).
Individually unable to financially counteract large donations and
organized political support, consumers and other stakeholders

7. Brody Mullins & Ann Zimmerman, Target Discovers Downside to Political
Contributions, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2010, at A2.
8. Emily Friedman, Target, Best Buy Angers Gay Customers by Making Contribution to
GOP Candidate, ABC NEWS (July 28, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/target-best-buyfire-campaign-contributions-minnesota-candidate/story?id=11270194.
9. Eliza Newlin Carney, New Spending Rules Mean New Backlash, NAT’L JOURNAL
(Dec. 16, 2010, 9:55 AM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/rules-of-the-game/newspending-rules-mean-new-backlash-20100830?mrefid=site_search.
10. Soda Brands Lose Fizz, BRANDWEEK (Sept. 3, 2010), http://web.archive.org/web/
20100907030059/http://www.brandweek.com/bw/content_display/news-and-features/direct/
e3i70ba82a0840c6bbf6596a26035616cbe (explaining that Brandweek calculates a buzz score by
weighing positive and negative perceptions of a certain brand).
11. Id. (reporting that, although the buzz score recovered slightly in the middle of August,
the score sunk again due to a rash of major newspaper op-eds, blog posts, and publicity
surrounding televised boycott ads from MoveOn.org, the progressive advocacy group that
partnered with gay-rights advocates to organize a movement against Target, in which the
organization collected close to 300,000 petition signatures from outraged customers); see also,
Carney, supra note 9 (discussing the negative effects that Target has suffered since the
disclosure).
12. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911–12 (1982). See generally
Harper, supra note 1, at 422 (advocating for a consumer right to boycott guaranteed by the
Constitution and tracing the derivation of the right).
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sometimes choose to wield their combined financial clout in the form
of actual or threatened boycotts to discourage what they consider to
be unpopular political positions. State and federal laws assist
consumers and stakeholders with this goal by requiring the
disclosure of identifying information about campaign donors and
signers of ballot initiatives and referenda.13
The recent Supreme Court case of Doe v. Reed14 called into
question the effectiveness, and potentially the legitimacy, of the
economic boycott in counteracting the influence of Major Political
Players in the electoral process. Citing various forms of harassment,
including fear of economic boycotts, the plaintiffs in Doe,
Washington state residents, sought an exemption from the statemandated disclosure requirements by claiming that it was a violation
of the First Amendment to compel the disclosure of the identities of
those who signed the ballot initiative.15 The majority’s holding,
written by Chief Justice Roberts, was very narrow: compelled
disclosure in a referendum context was as a general matter
constitutional.16 However, in dicta, the Court went on to say that
disclosure of the names of the initiative’s supporters could be subject
to an as-applied challenge if there was a reasonable probability that
disclosure would subject the signatories to threats, harassment, or
reprisals.17 Since this case was a facial challenge, the Court did not
reach the question of what types of activity might be sufficient to
successfully override any state interest in compelled disclosure.18 In
five concurring opinions and one dissent, however, six of the Justices
weighed in on the subject, with views so disparate that there is no
clear indication as to how the Court will evaluate such claims in the
future. This lack of clear direction leaves open the possibility of

13. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255, 261
(2010). This Note will use the term “ballot initiatives” to mean both ballot initiatives and
referenda.
14. 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
15. Id. at 2815.
16. Id. at 2821.
17. Id. at 2820–21 (explaining that those resisting disclosure need only show “a reasonable
probability that the compelled disclosure [of personal information] will subject them to threats,
harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties” (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam))).
18. Id. at 2817.

Fall 2011]

ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS AS HARASSMENT

213

exposing historically protected First Amendment activity to legal
challenge.
This Note argues that the Court should not allow Major Political
Players to use threatened or actual economic boycotts as justification
for exemptions from disclosure requirements in as-applied
challenges because economic boycotts advance historically
recognized First Amendment goals that are critical to our democracy
and that outweigh any competing claims of harassment. By rejecting
“economic boycott as harassment” claims, the Court would reaffirm
the economic boycott as protected First Amendment speech in
general and, more specifically, as a critical tool for debate and
dissent in the context of the electoral process. It is not this Note’s
position that harassment claims are never justified; they may be
persuasive when they are brought by minority or fringe groups or in
situations where ordinary individuals are targeted.19 This Note,
however, focuses on the ramifications of preventing economic
boycotts from countering large-scale influence on the political
process.
Part II reviews key Supreme Court rulings upholding the
economic boycott as protected First Amendment activity, the
establishment of the as-applied challenge and the harassment
exemption, and the existing tension between the Court’s embrace of
compelled disclosure and its protection of anonymous speech. Part
III examines the various opinions in Doe v. Reed and their potential
to undermine the economic boycott as protected speech in the
context of elections. It considers how these opinions could have the
effect of silencing speech and erecting barriers to dissent, and
suggests that Major Political Players should not have the right to
seek the exemption from disclosure that was originally created for
politically persecuted groups. Part IV analyzes how economic
boycotts advance the core democratic and First Amendment values
of truth-seeking and dissent and, in so doing, how they trump any
disclosure exemptions that Major Political Players may claim.

19. See infra Part IV.B.
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II. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
ECONOMIC BOYCOTT AND
THE HARASSMENT EXCEPTION
Over the last fifty years, the debate over compelled disclosure of
names, addresses, donation amounts, and other personal information
related to political donations or ballot initiatives has garnered
impassioned advocates and equally strong opponents. Federal
campaign-finance law requires such disclosure, and most states
authorize such disclosure in connection with government records and
documents.20 The public policy behind disclosure has remained the
same over time—it is intended to curb the influence of money and
special interests in elections while cleansing potentially corrupt
political practices and providing information to the electorate.21
Dating back to the 1890s, disclosure has been used not only for
monitoring the role money plays in elections, but also for ensuring
transparency in government22 and helping voters to make informed
decisions.23
Those in support of disclosure claim that the resulting
transparency adds to the democratic marketplace by allowing the free
and open exchange of ideas and provides a deterrent to excessively
large campaign contributions and undue influence.24 Opponents,
however, argue that compelled disclosure is an unconstitutional
burden since it not only infringes on one’s right to privacy and
results in the chilling of speech, but it also triggers acts of retaliation
or harassment by those of different ideological or political
persuasions.25 Since both sides of the debate have legitimate claims
to constitutional safeguards, the Court has increasingly had to
consider the question of which claim should be given more weight in
a particular case. Various as-applied challenges to disclosure laws
over the past sixty years reflect the balancing of the stated

20. Mayer, supra note 13, at 261–62.
21. Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 273 (2010).
22. Id. at 274.
23. Scott M. Noveck, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Legislative Process, 47 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 75, 82 (2010).
24. Id. at 101; see Trevor Potter, Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, in THE NEW
CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 123, 136 (2005).
25. Mayer, supra note 13, at 271–73.
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government interests behind disclosure with the First Amendment
protections at stake.26
A. The Economic Boycott as
Protected First Amendment Activity
As early as 1940, in Thornhill v. Alabama,27 the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of a statute broadly prohibiting
picketing in a labor dispute. In that case, the plaintiff was picketing
against an ex-employer and was convicted of violating a state code.28
The code prohibited loitering and picketing around the premises of a
business for the express purpose of advising current and prospective
customers of the business’s practices and affiliations and
encouraging those customers not to patronize the business.29 The
plaintiff charged that the statute deprived him of his right to free
speech, assembly, and right to petition for redress.30 The Court
agreed and held that the statute was unconstitutional on its face
because it was a “sweeping proscription of the freedom of
discussion”31 that prohibited “every practicable, effective means . . .
[to] enlighten the public . . . with respect to a matter which is of
public concern.”32 The Court found that safeguarding such means
was essential, even if the means risked injury to a business
establishment.33
Several decades later, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware,34 the
Court upheld the constitutionality of boycotts as retaliation against
businesses that engaged in race discrimination.35 In 1966, a
Mississippi branch of the NAACP participated in a seven-year
boycott of white merchants in the area, demanding racial equality,
justice, and integration.36 The defendants stood in front of stores and
encouraged African American customers not to patronize the
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See infra Part II.B–C.
310 U.S. 88 (1940).
Id. at 91–92.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 92–93.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 104–05.
458 U.S. 886 (1982).
Id. at 911–12.
Id. at 889, 893, 907.
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businesses.37 The Supreme Court of Mississippi upheld a chancery
court’s ruling that the boycott was unlawful according to the
common law and confirmed that the defendants were jointly and
severally liable for any business losses over the period.38 The Court
reversed the state court’s holding.39 Drawing on its decision in
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson40 (Patterson) discussed below,
the Court recognized the “importance of freedom of association in
guaranteeing the right of people to make their voices heard on public
issues.”41 Following this precedent, the Court held that the boycott in
Claiborne Hardware clearly involved First Amendment activity and
thus deserved protection.42
B. Precursors to the As-Applied Challenge:
The Rights to Private Association
and Anonymous Speech
In 1958, at the height of the civil rights movement, the Supreme
Court decided the landmark case of Patterson. The Court addressed
whether the state of Alabama could constitutionally compel the
NAACP to supply the state with a complete list of its members’ and
agents’ names and addresses to determine if the NAACP complied
with Alabama business law.43 The civil rights group claimed that it
was constitutionally protected from turning over the list on the
grounds that compelling the identification of its members would
infringe on their freedom of association under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.44 The Court unanimously
decided in favor of the plaintiffs by upholding the right of the
members to “pursue their lawful private interests privately.”45
Uncontroverted evidence of extreme intimidation and violence
against NAACP members persuaded the Court to rule in the
plaintiffs’ favor. The NAACP detailed numerous instances in which
37. See id. at 889–90, 893.
38. Id. at 894–95.
39. Id. at 934.
40. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
41. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 908 (quoting Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981)).
42. Id. at 911–12.
43. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 451.
44. Id. at 460.
45. Id. at 466.
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members faced “economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of
physical coercion, and . . . public hostility.”46 Acknowledging the
organization’s “dissident beliefs,”47 the Court reasoned that
subjecting the NAACP to compelled disclosure would threaten the
“effective advocacy of both public and private points of view,
particularly controversial ones, [which] is undeniably enhanced by
group association.”48 It concluded that these disclosure requirements
did not have a “substantial” bearing on the state’s interests and
therefore were not justified.49
The Court reinforced this holding two years later in Bates v. City
of Little Rock50 and Talley v. California.51 In Bates, the Court
confronted a situation in Arkansas that was almost identical to the
one in Alabama: amid a racially charged climate, county
administrators demanded that the Little Rock branch of the NAACP
produce lists of its members in compliance with the local tax
ordinance.52 The NAACP refused, asserting the right of its members
to associate anonymously, and the Court again unanimously upheld
this right based on “substantial uncontroverted evidence . . . [of]
harassment and threats of bodily harm” to the members.53 This time
the Court invoked the First Amendment right of peaceable assembly,
a notion that the Court did not rely on in Patterson, when it stated
that “compulsory disclosure of the membership lists . . . would work
a significant interference with the freedom of association of their
members.”54
In Talley, an individual plaintiff was charged with violating a
Los Angeles city ordinance that broadly restricted the distribution of
any handbill that did not identify the name and address of the
individual who had created or circulated it.55 Talley, on behalf of the
National Consumers Mobilization, distributed pamphlets urging

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 462.
Id.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 464–65.
361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960).
362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960).
Bates, 361 U.S. at 517–18.
Id. at 523–24.
Id. at 522–23.
Talley, 362 U.S. at 60–61.
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consumers to boycott businesses that did not offer equal opportunity
employment to “Negroes, Mexicans, and Orientals.”56 Although the
ordinance did not specifically target a civil rights group such as the
NAACP, Talley’s pamphlet did address civil rights issues.57 The
Supreme Court relied on both Patterson and Bates in voiding the
ordinance, reasoning that the “identification and fear of reprisal
might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of
importance.”58 Recognizing the fundamental role that anonymous
literature had played in “criticiz[ing] oppressive practices and laws,”
the Court held that validating the ordinance would abridge the
plaintiff’s freedoms of speech and the press.59
C. Protecting Minor Parties:
Buckley’s Reasonable Probability Test
and the Socialist Workers’ Party Exception
The Court relied heavily on its decisions in civil rights cases
from the previous decade when, in the 1976 case Buckley v. Valeo,60
it confronted the issue of compelled disclosure in the realm of
campaign finance law.61 Although the Court in Buckley primarily
addressed the constitutionality of spending ceilings for political
contributions, its decision was also instrumental in establishing the
tenets of disclosure jurisprudence that courts consistently defer to
today.62 The Court in this case upheld the Federal Election Campaign
Act (FECA) disclosure requirements,63 while it acknowledged that
56. Id. at 61.
57. See id. at 61, 64–65.
58. Id. at 65.
59. Id. at 64–65.
60. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
61. Id. at 25, 64, 71. “There could well be a case, similar to those before the Court in
[Patterson] and Bates, where the threat to the exercise of First Amendment rights is so serious
and the state interest furthered by disclosure so insubstantial that the Act’s requirements cannot
be constitutionally applied.” Id. at 71.
62. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898, 908 (2010); Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct.
2811, 2818 (2010); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 120–22 (2003); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995).
63. The FECA required political committees, parties, and candidates to register with the
FEC and disclose their contributors and the size of the contributions. 2 U.S.C. § 432 (2006). It
also compelled groups to disclose the recipient and size of the expenditure. Id. § 433. An
expenditure is defined as “any purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of
money or anything of value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for
Federal office.” Id. § 431(9)(A).
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there is a critical exception when a court might consider disclosure to
be unconstitutional.64 Drawing on Patterson and Bates,65 the Court
suggested that minor political parties and their contributors that
could prove a “reasonable probability that the compelled
disclosure . . . will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals
from either Government officials or private parties”66 could gain an
exemption from disclosure. It characterized “minor parties” as those
with a small political base whose unconventional or unpopular ideas
had “little or no chance of winning.”67 The Court reasoned that minor
parties were unlikely to have a firm financial base; therefore,
compelled disclosure could threaten their very survival.68 Although
the Court did not carve out an absolute exemption for all minor
parties, it set forth the burden of proof that a party must overcome to
bring a successful as-applied challenge on such grounds.69
Six years after Buckley, the Court applied that test for the first
time in Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Committee70
(Socialist Workers’ Party), in which members of the Socialist
Workers’ Party (SWP) in Ohio challenged the constitutionality of the
state’s campaign-finance reporting and disclosure laws.71 Based on
evidence of the SWP’s sixty-person membership, mediocre success
at the polls, and miniscule campaign contributions,72 the Court
characterized the SWP as a minor party.73 Like the NAACP, the
SWP had presented a robust factual record that showed that
government officials and private citizens had harassed members; the
harassment included destruction of property, the firing of gunshots at
an SWP headquarters, threatening phone calls, hate mail, and loss of
employment.74 The Court found that the harassment was “ingrained
64. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 71.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 71–72, 74.
67. See id. at 68–72. For instance, the Court considered independent and new political
parties to be “minor parties.” See id. at 87–88.
68. Id. at 71.
69. Id. at 74.
70. 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
71. Id. at 89.
72. Id. at 88–89.
73. Id. at 98–102.
74. Id. at 98–100. Twenty-two of the sixty SWP members had been fired from their jobs
based on their affiliation with the SWP. Citing the district court decision, the Court recognized
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and likely to continue.”75 Similar to the way it viewed the NAACP,
the Court viewed the SWP as a historically persecuted and
vulnerable group.76 Notwithstanding the Court’s otherwise strong
affirmation of disclosure requirements, the Court upheld the
challenge, maintaining that disclosure would infringe the First
Amendment rights of both members and supporters of the SWP.77
D. The Conflict Between Anonymous Speech and
Compelled Disclosure in the Electoral Process
Thirty-five years after its decision in Talley, the Court
reexamined the issue of anonymous speech in McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Commission.78 The case centered on Margaret McIntyre,
who authored leaflets expressing her opposition to a proposed
school-tax referendum and publicly distributed them at a public
meeting and on car windshields in a school parking lot.79 McIntyre’s
name appeared on some pamphlets, but on others, she credited the
bills to “Concerned Parents and Tax Payers,” a fictitious
organization.80 McIntyre was subsequently charged with violating an
Ohio election statute that forbade anonymous publication designed to
promote or defeat a ballot issue, and she was fined $100. 81 The Court
struck down Ohio’s identification requirement and reaffirmed the
notion that the First Amendment protects a person’s decision to
remain anonymous.82 The Court held that the “the interest in having
anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably
outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition
of entry.”83 The Court characterized McIntyre’s advocacy as
“[u]rgent, important, and effective speech,” which deserved even
more protection since it occurred during a controversial referendum

that “private hostility and harassment toward SWP members make it difficult for them to
maintain employment.” Id. at 99.
75. Id. at 101.
76. See id. at 99–101.
77. Id. at 101–02.
78. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
79. Id. at 337.
80. Id. at 337, 341–42.
81. Id. at 338–39 & n.3.
82. Id. at 357.
83. Id. at 342.
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vote.84 While the Court in Buckley emphasized the informational
value that disclosure served in helping voters evaluate candidates,85
the Court in McIntyre concluded that knowing the name and address
of a private citizen added little to the “ability to evaluate the
document’s message.”86
However, in 2009, a California federal district court decided a
controversial case that represented a shift away from protecting
anonymity and toward compelling disclosure; this foreshadowed
many of the issues that the Supreme Court would address only a year
later in Doe v. Reed. The district court case, ProtectMarriage.com v.
Bowen87 dealt with the backlash that supporters of Proposition 8, an
anti-gay marriage ballot initiative, received.88 Proposition 8 sought to
amend the state constitution to define and recognize marriage as a
union between a man and a woman.89 The plaintiffs, who comprised
a number of ballot committees that were formed to support the
passage of Proposition 8, challenged the constitutionality of
California’s Political Reform Act of 1974.90 The Act required the
plaintiffs to disclose personal information about their donors,
including the donors’ names, street addresses, occupations,
employers, and amounts contributed.91 The plaintiffs sought to enjoin
a second round of disclosure based on the Buckley/SWP exemption,92
maintaining that they had sustained extensive economic injury from
boycotts.93
84. Id. at 347.
85. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 81 (1976) (per curiam).
86. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348–49.
87. 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
88. See infra notes 249–51 and accompanying text.
89. See ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1199.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Although the Court in Buckley originally articulated the harassment exemption, this Note
will refer to the exemption as the “Buckley/SWP exemption.” While Buckley is best known for its
holding regarding the constitutionality of independent expenditures and contributions, the holding
in Socialist Workers’ Party was limited to whether the SWP was entitled to an exemption from
disclosure. Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 88 (1982); Buckley,
424 U.S. at 12–14.
93. See ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1200–04. The author of one anonymous
declaration that was submitted to the court recounted how his business had been the target of
numerous boycotts and pickets, several of which were orchestrated through Facebook; how
negative reviews of his store had been posted on Yelp.com; and how patrons had visited his place
of business to express their disapproval of his position. Id. at 1201. Another donor complained of
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Judge England rebuked the plaintiffs for relying on the
Buckley/SWP exemption to justify an exemption from disclosure for
an anti-gay movement that enjoyed widespread popular support.94 He
noted that the plaintiffs’ ballot initiative was “successful at the polls,
[had] evidenced a very minimal effect on [the plaintiffs’] ability to
sustain their movement, and [was] unable to produce evidence of
pervasive animosity even remotely reaching the level of that present
in” Socialist Workers’ Party.95 He concluded that the supporters of
Proposition 8, as “backers of a historically non-controversial
belief,”96 could not be considered a minor party for purposes of the
as-applied challenge.97 He further declared that the threats and
harassment that the plaintiffs suffered did not compare to the violent,
ongoing, and pervasive harassment that was present in Patterson and
Socialist Workers’ Party.98 In ProtectMarriage.com, the harassment
was comparatively benign, occurred over the course of only a few
months, and targeted only a small segment of supporters.99 The court
also noted that numerous acts about which the plaintiffs were
complaining, including economic boycotts, were fundamental,
lawful, and historical means of voicing dissent.100 The judge further
chastised,
Plaintiffs’ exemption argument appears to be premised, in
large part, on the concept that individuals should be free
from even legal consequences of their speech. That is
simply not the nature of their right. Just as contributors to
Proposition 8 are free to speak in favor of the initiative, so

receiving an e-mail threatening damage to his company’s reputation based on his support of
Proposition 8. Id. at 1202.
94. Id. at 1215–16.
95. Id. at 1214.
96. Id. at 1219.
97. Id. at 1215–16 (explaining that the plaintiffs were part of a larger group of proponents of
the initiative that garnered nearly $30 million in funding and had convinced more than seven
million California residents to vote in favor of Proposition 8 on Election Day).
98. Id. at 1216.
99. Id. at 1214 (“[T]his Court must now evaluate whether Brown can properly be applied to
groups that were successful at the polls, that have evidenced a very minimal effect on their ability
to sustain their movement, and that are unable to produce evidence of pervasive animosity even
remotely reaching the level of that present in Brown.”).
100. Id. at 1218 (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) and NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)).
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are opponents free to express their disagreement through
proper legal means.101
III. DOE V. REED:
THE THREAT TO THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT
AS PROTECTED FIRST AMENDMENT ACTIVITY
IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
Over the last thirty-five years, courts have issued seemingly
conflicting opinions—some that embrace compelled disclosure and
others that protect anonymity in the electoral process.102 Furthermore,
courts have not reconsidered or clarified the harassment exemption
by applying the as-applied challenge or by crafting of specific
rules.103 To date, Socialist Workers’ Party remains the only case in
which the Supreme Court has granted an as-applied challenge that
was based on claims of harassment.104
In June 2010, the Supreme Court decided Doe v. Reed,105 a
decision that observers thought might bring some clarity to a field
filled with uncertainty.106 In this case, the Court, like the federal
district court in ProtectMarriage.com, moved away from protecting
anonymity and held that the compelled disclosure of signatory
information on referendum petitions was constitutional.107 However,
although Justice Stevens began his concurrence by observing that

101. Id. at 1217.
102. See supra Part II.D.
103. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Has the Tide Turned in Favor of Disclosure? Revealing
Money in Politics After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV 1057, 1100
(2011).
104. Id. at 1096.
105. 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
106. See also Richard L. Hasen, Show Me the Donors, SLATE (Oct. 14, 2010, 4:06 PM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2271187/ (examining the current state of campaign finance disclosure
and its effectiveness); Dale A. Oesterle, Doe v. Reed a Disappointment on Several Fronts,
ELECTION L. @ MORITZ (July 2, 2010), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/
index.php?ID=7425 (criticizing the Doe decision for several reasons, including that it failed to
answer the critical question regarding the challenge to the specific referendum at issue); see
generally Richard Briffault, Two Challenges for Campaign Finance Disclosure After Citizens
United and Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 983 (2011) (examining the results of the
Citizens United and Doe decisions on disclosure law going forward).
107. Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2815.
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“[t]his is not a hard case,”108 the decision, with five concurrences and
one dissenting opinion, raised more questions than it answered.109
A. The Decision in Doe v. Reed:
A Facial Challenge
Doe v. Reed centered on Washington State Referendum-71
(“R-71”), which sought to revoke the state’s then-recent extension of
rights and benefits to same-sex couples.110 In order to verify that a
sufficient number of registered voters wished to see the measure
placed on the ballot, the state required proponents to turn over the
signed petitions that included the names and addresses of the
signatories to the secretary of state, who deemed the petitions public
records under Washington’s Public Records Act (PRA) and thus
subject to the state’s disclosure requirements.111 Soon after the
proponents submitted the R-71 petitions to the secretary of state’s
office, demands for copies began to trickle in.112 WhoSigned.org and
KnowThyNeighbor.org, two of the groups seeking access to the
records, planned on posting the signatories’ names and addresses in a
searchable online database.113 In response, Protect Marriage
Washington, the organization sponsoring R-71, filed a complaint in
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington to
enjoin the secretary of state from publicly releasing the names and
addresses of the signers.114
108. Id. at 2829 (Stevens, J., concurring).
109. Adam Liptak, Secrecy Rejected on Ballot Petitions, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2010, at A22.
(“The near-unanimity of the decision masked a deep division on a more focused question that the
justices left for another day: Are there good reasons to protect the identities of people who signed
petitions concerning a measure opposing gay rights and say they fear harassment and retaliation
should their names be posted on the Internet?”); Eliza Newlin Carney, Campaign Finance Fight
Moves to Disclosure, NAT’L JOURNAL (Dec. 18, 2010, 9:22 PM), http://nationaljournal.com/
columns/rules-of-the-game/campaign-finance-fight-moves-to-disclosure-20100503
(“The
intensifying debate has raised questions that to go the heart of American political engagement.
How much secrecy is too much? How much transparency treads on privacy and free speech?”);
see Daniel Schuman, The Ticking Time Bomb in the Supreme Court’s Doe v. Reed Opinion,
SUNLIGHT FOUND. (June 25, 2010, 8:02 PM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2010/06/
25/the-ticking-time-bomb-in-the-supreme-court%E2%80%99s-doe-v-reed-opinion/.
110. Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2816.
111. Id. at 2815–16.
112. Id. at 2816 (explaining that Protect Marriage Washington submitted 137,000 signatures
on July 25, 2009, and by August 20, 2009, the secretary of state had already received several
requests for copies).
113. Id.
114. Id.
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The plaintiffs asserted two claims. The first, a broad facial
challenge, alleged that the application of Washington’s PRA to
referendum petitions in general violated the First Amendment.115 The
second, as-applied claim asserted that the application of the PRA in
the specific case of R-71 was unconstitutional based on Buckley.116
The plaintiffs alleged that there would be a reasonable probability
that the disclosure would subject R-71 signers to threats, harassment,
and reprisals.117 Because the district court found for the plaintiffs on
the first claim, it never reached the second claim; therefore, only the
broad facial challenge to R-71 reached the Ninth Circuit and the
claim regarding the as-applied exemption was never heard.118
The State of Washington offered two compelling state interests
justifying disclosure: first, to preserve the integrity of its referendum
process by combating fraud and fostering government transparency
and accountability; and second, to provide the electorate with
information as to who was supporting the petition so that voters
could make an informed decision.119 The plaintiffs argued that
publishing the signers personal information online would
“effectively become a blueprint for harassment and intimidation.”120
But the plaintiffs’ argument was only based on specific harm that
disclosure would impose on R-71 signers. They did not offer
sufficient evidence to convince a majority of the Justices that
disclosure would also impose severe burdens on signers of typical
ballot initiatives that, unlike R-71, are usually not controversial.121
Determining that the anticorruption interest was sufficient to justify
disclosure under the PRA, the Court did not address the question of
the informational interest.122
In an 8–1 majority opinion, which only took up a fifth of the
entire length of the Court’s decision,123 Chief Justice Roberts
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2816, 2820–21.
119. Id. at 2819.
120. Id. at 2820.
121. Id. at 2821 (referring to referenda relating to taxes, revenue, or the budget as “typical”).
122. Id. at 2819 (Chief Justice Roberts stated, “[W]e need not, and do not, address the State’s
‘informational’ interest.”).
123. The majority opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts totaled seven pages. The other six
opinions totaled twenty-six pages in length.
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acknowledged that individuals express some form of a political view
when they commit their names to a petition for a ballot initiative.124
He reasoned that since such activity is expressive, petition signing
constituted political speech protected by the First Amendment.125
Nonetheless, the Court rejected the facial challenge, upholding the
disclosure requirement of the PRA in the context of ballot initiatives
in general, pointing out that “the PRA is not a prohibition on speech,
but instead a disclosure requirement . . . [which] may burden the
ability to speak, but . . . do[es] not prevent anyone from speaking.”126
As Buckley allowed,127 the plaintiffs in Doe cited examples in
their briefs from the history of Proposition 8 in California, to argue
that they would be subject to harassment in the form of economic
boycotts if their names were disclosed.128 Since the narrower claim
that R-71 signatories were likely to be targets of harassment was not
before the Court, the Court did not have to decide what precise
activity would constitute sufficient grounds to justify an as-applied
challenge to disclosure. However, the majority noted that the
plaintiffs’ right to bring such a challenge based on the Buckley/SWP
exemption remained available, thus opening the door for the other
Justices to opine on the merits of that challenge.129
B. The Various Opinions in Doe:
Perspectives on the As-Applied Challenge
Despite the fact that the plaintiffs cited the threat of economic
boycotts in Doe as one type of harassment giving rise to their claim
124. Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2818.
125. Id. This reasoning was in tension with the reasoning in earlier Supreme Court decisions
that rejected ballot voting as a form of individual expression. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New
Party, 520 U.S. 351, 363 (1997) (holding that Minnesota’s anti-fusion laws prohibiting candidates
from appearing on a ballot as a candidate of more than one political party did not violate the First
and Fourteenth Amendments); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430, 437–38 (1992).
126. Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2818 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (“New parties that have no history upon which
to draw may be able to offer evidence of reprisals and threats directed against individuals or
organizations holding similar views.”).
128. Petitioners’ Brief at 11, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (No. 09-559), 2010 WL
711186, at *11 (“Boycotts were threatened: ‘We shall boycott the businesses of EVERYONE
who signs your odious, bigoted petition.’”).
129. Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2821 (“[W]e note—as we have in other election law disclosure
cases—that upholding the law against a broad-based challenge does not foreclose a litigant’s
success in a narrower one.”).
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for exemption from disclosure, only Justice Alito addressed this
claim directly. The divergent views of the remaining Justices as to
what type of activity could constitute harassment, and what type of
plaintiff might be eligible to bring such claims, have sent conflicting
and confusing signals regarding whether such boycotts will remain
protected First Amendment activity. During oral arguments in Doe,
Justice Kennedy asked both sides why, if Claiborne Hardware
upheld a boycott as protected First Amendment activity, that case
could be used as justification for granting an as-applied exemption.130
The plaintiffs’ attorney offered no response to this direct question;131
not one of the Justices in any of the seven opinions comprising this
case addressed the conflict inherent in these two positions.
1. The Economic Boycott as Harassment:
The Threat to “Uninhibited,
Robust, and Wide-Open” Debate132
None of the Justices made any mention whatsoever of the effect
that disclosure exemptions would have on stifling historically
protected speech. However, the views of some of the Justices are
instructive as to how they would evaluate future claims of
harassment and, by extension, whether they would consider
economic boycotts as harassment that results in the suppression of
speech in the marketplace.
Justices Alito and Thomas were strongly in favor of granting
exemptions based on fear of harassment, albeit on vastly different
grounds. Justice Alito’s concurring opinion was the most specific on
this point. He noted that the plaintiffs’ reliance on evidence of
boycotts and blacklists of businesses that similarly situated plaintiffs
faced in the Proposition 8 controversy in California provided a strong
case for an exemption, stating, “[I]f the evidence relating to
Proposition 8 is not sufficient to obtain an as-applied exemption in
this case, one may wonder whether that vehicle provides any
meaningful protection for the First Amendment rights of persons

130. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13–14, 38–39, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (No.
09-559), 2010 WL 1789917, *13–14, *38–39.
131. Id.
132. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (capitalization altered from
original).
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who circulate and sign referendum and initiative petitions.”133
Although he did not address boycotts directly, Justice Thomas went
even further in his dissent, making the case that subjecting ballot
initiatives to disclosure is always unconstitutional.134 In one of
several rationales, Justice Thomas relied on Patterson and Socialist
Workers’ Party to point out that signing a referendum petition is an
act of political association that the First Amendment protects.135
On the polar opposite side of the issue was Justice Scalia, who
doubted that petition signing constituted an act that “fits within
freedom of speech at all” but contended, for the sake of argument,
that the First Amendment would not prohibit disclosure.136 Making a
strong case for allowing differing opinions into the marketplace, he
admonished that democracy requires “civic courage”137:
[H]arsh criticism, short of unlawful action, is a price our
people have traditionally been willing to pay for selfgovernance. Requiring people to stand up in public for their
political acts fosters civic courage, without which
democracy is doomed. For my part, I do not look forward to
a society which, thanks to the Supreme Court, campaigns
anonymously and even exercises the direct democracy of
initiative and referendum hidden from public scrutiny and
protected from the accountability of criticism. This does not
resemble the Home of the Brave.138
Justice Sotomayor also favored disclosure in this case; in a
concurring opinion that Justices Stevens and Ginsburg joined, she
imagined a very high bar for plaintiffs who seek to qualify for an asapplied exemption.139 Citing Patterson, she suggested that, barring
application of a facially neutral petition in a discriminatory manner,
exemptions should be limited to “the rare circumstance in which
disclosure poses a reasonable probability of serious and widespread
harassment that the State is unwilling or unable to control.”140 In a
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2823–24 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 2837 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2839.
Id. at 2832 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2837.
Id.
Id. at 2829 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. (emphasis added).
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separate concurrence, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer,
noted that he would “demand strong evidence before concluding that
an indirect and speculative chain of events imposes a substantial
burden on speech.”141 Like Justice Sotomayor, he also suggested a
stringent burden of proof: absent “rare” situations like those in Bates
or Socialist Workers’ Party, where the individual threat level is not
so high but disclosure requirements would threaten the ability of a
group to place a matter on the ballot, “a significant threat of
harassment . . . that cannot be mitigated by law enforcement
measures” should be required to succeed in an as-applied
challenge.142
The Court now appears to be divided on the issue of whether
exemptions from disclosure are merited based on fear of economic
boycotts. Although the plaintiffs in Doe are distinguishable from
companies like Target and Gold’s Gym (who may seek such
exemptions), both Justices Alito and Thomas appear to be open to
granting exemptions to even Major Political Players. Justice Alito,
relying on Buckley’s more relaxed “reasonable probability” standard,
was prepared to accept the plaintiffs’ speculative evidence of
harassment.143 Justice Thomas, in noting the need to protect privacy
of association, observed that “signing a referendum petition is a
paradigmatic example of ‘the practice of persons sharing common
views banding together to achieve a common end,’”144 and he pointed
out that a referendum supported by only one person would be of no
effect. However, he neglected to address the fact that the same
rationale can just as easily be applied to the need of individuals to
band together in boycotts to effectuate their goals.
On the other hand, one could extrapolate from the opinions of
Justices Scalia, Sotomayor, and Stevens that they, along with Justice
Ginsburg, would be hard-pressed to grant exemptions based on fear
of economic boycotts but instead would favor allowing this speech to
enter the marketplace.145 Although neither Justice Sotomayor nor
141. Id. at 2831 (Stevens, J., concurring).
142. Id.
143. See id. at 2823–24 (Alito, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 2839 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981)).
145. See id. at 2836–37 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2829 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I
find it difficult to see how any incremental disincentive to sign a petition would tip the
constitutional balance.”).
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Justice Stevens addressed what form of activity would constitute
“serious and widespread harassment” or a “significant threat” of
harassment, their reliance on Patterson and Socialist Workers’ Party
suggests that they likely envisioned applying the exemption only to
persecuted social groups or fringe political parties that suffered
extreme harassment over extended periods of time.146 Each of these
four Justices seemed intent on discouraging any regulation of speech,
except in the narrowest of circumstances.147 As Justice Sotomayor
acknowledged, “[O]penness in the democratic process is of ‘critical
importance.’”148
2. The Threat to an Informed Electorate:
Strengthening Legal Barriers to Dissent
If the Court deems the threat of an economic boycott to be
sufficient grounds for an as-applied exemption from disclosure
requirements, it risks undermining the value of an economic boycott
as an expression of dissent. Although the Justices in Doe encountered
facts that were almost identical to those of the Proposition 8
controversy in California, none of the Justices voiced the clear
sentiment that Judge England expressed in ProtectMarriage.com. He
explained:
[T]he Court simply cannot ignore the fact that numerous of
the acts about which Plaintiffs’ complain are mechanisms
relied upon, both historically and lawfully, to voice dissent.
The decision and ability to patronize a particular
establishment or business is an inherent right of the
American people, and the public has historically remained
free to choose where to, or not to, allocate its economic
resources. As such, individuals have repeatedly resorted to
boycotts as a form of civil protest intended to convey a
powerful message.149

146. See id. at 2829 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Case-specific relief may be available . . . in
the rare circumstance in which disclosure poses a reasonable probability of serious and
widespread harassment . . . .”); id. at 2831 (Stevens, J., concurring).
147. See id. at 2821 (majority opinion); id. at 2823 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 2829
(Sotomayor, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 2828 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
495 (1975)).
149. ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1218 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
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These “powerful messages” that protest the behavior of Major
Political Players are in danger of being stifled if economic boycotts
are deemed to be harassment.
WhoSigned.org explained that it requested disclosure of the
R-71 signatures because it wanted to engage the signers in
“uncomfortable” conversations about the issue of gay marriage
addressed in the ballot initiative150 (i.e., to engage in debate on the
subject). At least one scholar has observed that, in his majority
opinion in Doe, Chief Justice Roberts left the door open for an asapplied challenge based on the reasonable probability of harassment
resulting from the “controversialness [sic] of the issue”151 rather than
from the vulnerability of a group, as was the case in Patterson and
Socialist Workers’ Party. Examining the various opinions in Doe
reveals some disagreement on the topic of controversial ballot
initiatives. However, while one may argue that controversial
petitions inherently are more likely to lead to harassment, it is
inarguable that they are also more likely to benefit from debate, an
exercise that would be stifled by granting such exemptions from
disclosure.
In disallowing the plaintiffs’ facial challenge, Chief Justice
Roberts alluded to a distinction that could be made between
protection from disclosure in “typical” referendum petitions, such as
those involving “tax policy, revenue, budget, or other state law
issues[,]” and in “controversial” ones such as the R-71 petition.152 He
150. Press Release, KnowThyNeighbor.org, KnowThyNeighbor.org Partners with
WhoSigned.org in Washington State (June 1, 2009), available at http://knowthy
neighbor.blogs.com/home/2009/06/knowthyneighbororg-partners-with-whosignedorg-inwashington-state.html (“WhoSigned.org expects Washington State’s pro-equality citizens to use
its online tools to find the names of people they know, and talk with those people about the real
world impact of their actions. ‘Conversations like these can be uncomfortable, but they are
necessary for people to understand how vital these basic rights and protections are for gay and
straight families alike.’”); see also Press Release, KnowThyNeighbor.org, Names of Arkansas
Anti-Gay
Petition
Signers
Posted
Online
(Apr. 28,
2009),
available
at
http://knowthyneighbor.blogs.com/home/2009/04/press-release-names-of-arkansas-antigaypetition-signers-posted-online.html (announcing the release of signatures on similar petitions in
Arkansas and stating that KnowThyNeighbor.org “expect[ed] that many petition signers will be
confronted about their actions as their names are discovered on the website by family members,
friends, coworkers, customers, and acquaintances”).
151. Monica Youn, Remarks at the Brennan Center for Justice Accountability After Citizens
United—Panel Three (Apr. 29, 2011), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/content/pages/
accountability_after_citizens_united_panel_three_questions_and_answers_tran (transcript and
video).
152. Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2821.
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observed that burdens imposed by typical petitions are not “remotely
like the burdens plaintiffs fear in this case.”153 Justice Alito echoed
this observation, noting that the plaintiffs had provided no evidence
that disclosure would discourage signers of typical petitions from
participating in the electoral process.154 Justice Sotomayor disagreed
with Justice Roberts’s distinction and instead argued that a state’s
interest in protecting the integrity of the electoral process remained
undiminished despite the fact that the referendum involved a
controversial subject and the fact that signers feared harassment from
non-state actors.155 Although Justice Thomas also disagreed with the
Chief Justice’s distinction, he drew the opposite conclusion that the
combination of Washington’s disclosure laws and the difficulty in
predicting which ballot initiatives would prove controversial was a
recipe for the unconstitutional chilling of speech.156
It is also worth noting that in examining Washington’s
justification for the PRA, Chief Justice Roberts was able to avoid
discussion of the state’s interest in having an informed electorate
because he relied on the state’s interest in preserving the integrity of
elections.157 The other Justices exhibited conflicting points of view
on the state’s informational interest. Justice Sotomayor referred to
the need for disclosure to enable the electorate to make informed
decisions.158 On the other hand, Justice Alito was openly hostile to
the value of informing voters about who financed a referendum and
how to contact the referendum’s supporters, given that those
supporters feared retaliation and recrimination.159 He suggested that
disclosing this information would constitute “a means of facilitating
harassment that impermissibly chills the exercise of First
Amendment rights.”160 Justice Thomas asserted that “[p]eople are
intelligent enough to evaluate the merits of a referendum without
knowing who supported it.”161
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id. at 2822 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 2829 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 2846 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2819–20 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2828 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 2824–25 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 2825.
Id. at 2843 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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One may argue that the members of KnowThyNeighbor.org and
WhoSigned.org were a bit disingenuous in stating that their objective
in seeking disclosure was to engage the signers of R-71 in
“uncomfortable conversations.” It may be that their request for
disclosure was really prompted by a need for information necessary
to implement organized responses to the signatories, including
boycotts. Undoubtedly, the Internet has fundamentally changed the
ease with which we can access information about our opponents and
physically confront them.162 However, as much as one has the right to
make political donations or sign one’s name to a petition without
being harassed via illegal activities, one also has the right to express
opposition to another’s political view through constitutionally
protected speech such as economic boycotts.
3. The Co-option of the Minor Party
Interest by Major Political Players
The plaintiffs in Doe relied on the Buckley/SWP exemption that
the Court originally developed for minor parties to justify the
plaintiffs’ claim for an exemption from disclosure,163 despite the
world of difference between being an African American in the 1950s
and a heterosexual adult representing a mainstream view in 2010.
However, the Court ignored the distinction by allowing the
Buckley/SWP exemption to guide any future as-applied challenge by
the plaintiffs and signaling the Court’s openness to apply this test to
Major Political Players.164
In his concurrence, Justice Alito embraced this idea, comparing
the right to private association that the plaintiffs raised in Doe to the
same rights that the NAACP and the SWP claimed.165 This
comparison mischaracterizes not only the rationale behind the
Buckley/SWP exemption, but also the nature, context, and likelihood
of the harm present in Patterson and Socialist Workers’ Party.166
162. See generally Briffault, supra note 21 (discussing the effect of the Internet and social
media on campaign finance and disclosure regulations).
163. Noveck, supra note 23, at 97 (explaining that the Buckley/SWP exemption “to disclosure
requirements would only be necessary for small or fringe groups and that disclosure of
contributors to major parties was constitutionally sound”).
164. See Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2821.
165. Id. at 2824–25 (Alito, J., concurring).
166. See Youn, supra note 151 (discussing how Patterson has been de-contextualized and
distorted in the current debate on campaign finance disclosure).
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When forging the as-applied standard for exemptions from
disclosure, the Court in Buckley and Socialist Workers’ Party was
heavily influenced by what had happened the previous decade in
Patterson and Bates.167 By the time that the Court decided Patterson,
the plaintiffs and other African Americans had already suffered years
of harassment.168 Despite their nonviolent attempts to end segregation
in the South, African Americans were terrorized by the use of lynch
mobs, rapes, fire hoses, police dogs, and other acts of violence.169 For
example, in the middle of the night on June 29, 1958, the day before
the Court rendered its decision in Patterson, a bomb exploded at
Bethel Baptist Church in Birmingham for the second time in two
years.170 Its pastor, Fred Shuttlesworth, an active member of the civil
rights movement and of the NAACP’s Alabama chapter, had been
the target.171 In the case of NAACP members in Alabama and
Arkansas in the fifties and sixties, the Court found that disclosure of
their association with the NAACP posed “existential threats”172 to

167. See supra note 61 and accompanying text; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 70–71
(1976) (reasoning that the government’s interest in disclosure is greatly diminished in the context
of minor parties because minor party candidates’ ideological positions are generally more
discernable and minor parties have less chance of winning, so the risk of corruption is lower).
168. In 1955, E. Frederick Morrow, the first African American White House staff member,
submitted a file memo to the Eisenhower administration warning that “we are on the verge of a
dangerous racial conflagration in the Southern section of the country.” Memorandum of Record
from E. Frederick Morrow, Admin. Officer, Special Projects Grp., White House (Nov. 22, 1955)
(on file with the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library), available at http://web.archive.org/web/
20040501070811/http://eisenhower.archives.gov/Dl/Civil_Rights_Emmett_Till_Case/EmmettTill
Case.html (follow “Page 1” hyperlink under “Memorandum for the Record, E. Frederick Morrow
re: Emmett Till, November 22, 1955”). He noted, “a frightening power has been built in
Mississippi by the anti-desegregation White Citizens Councils, and their principal method is one
of economic terrorism. These Councils are fanning out throughout the South, and they have
created a climate of fear and terrorism that holds the entire area in a vise.” Id. (follow “Page 2”
hyperlink under “Memorandum for the Record, E. Frederick Morrow re: Emmett Till, November
22, 1955”).
169. See generally Civil Rights Movement Timeline 1961, CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
VETERANS, http://www.crmvet.org/tim/timhis61.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2011) (giving a
history and timeline of the Southern Freedom Movement in 1961).
170. Glenn T. Eskew, “The Classes and the Masses”: Fred Shuttlesworth’s Movement and
Birmingham’s Black Middle Class, in BIRMINGHAM REVOLUTIONARIES: THE REVEREND FRED
SHUTTLESWORTH AND THE ALABAMA CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 31, 39–40
(Marjorie L. White & Andrew M. Manis eds., 2000).
171. Id. at 33, 37, 39–40.
172. See Paul Barton, Midterm Money Rush: The Secret Outsiders, CAP. NEWS CONNECTION
(Oct. 21,
2010),
http://www.capitolnewsconnection.org/news/midterm-money-rush-secretoutsiders.
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their lives and livelihoods as African Americans living in a racist
society.
The Court more appropriately applied the disclosure exemption
several years later in Socialist Workers’ Party, where the plaintiffs
were members of a political party with a sixty-person membership
roll, and, consequently, the Court was concerned with the risk of
silencing a fringe group.173 But in Doe, the plaintiffs were supporters
of a popular cause, were never subjected to any government
discrimination or hostility or severe and widespread harm, and were
not members of a demographic minority. Rather, the petition signers
endured harassment only while the petition was being circulated over
a period of two months. Furthermore, the record of harassment
against R-71 supporters included the relatively minor offenses of
name-calling, threats to withdraw donations to a pastor’s church,
argumentative phone calls, and a threatening blog post directed
toward the family of the petition’s campaign manager.174 As a result,
the plaintiffs primarily relied on the evidence of more egregious
harassment against supporters of Proposition 8 in California.175
Although courts may consider evidence of harassment of similarly
situated groups when they apply the Buckley/SWP exemption, the
plaintiffs in Doe offered evidence of harm that was far less grievous
than that in Patterson and Socialist Workers’ Party. Therefore, the
Court likely did not intend to apply an exemption that is “historically
reserved for small groups [that] promot[e] ideas almost unanimously
rejected” and that are vulnerable to serious retaliation to the plaintiffs
in Doe, who offered little evidence of chilled speech or
harassment.176
If the Court were to broadly construe the Buckley/SWP
exemption to apply to any group that shows a reasonable threat of
harassment or intimidation, that would be a welcome development
for Major Political Players. Bruce Josten, the executive vice
president of government affairs for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
173. Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 88, 91, 98 (1982).
174. GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS, CLAIMS OF HARASSMENT AND
INTIMIDATION DOCUMENT REVIEW 21, 22, 66 (Apr. 5, 2010), available at
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/doe-v-reed/doe-v-reed-compiled-analysis.pdf.
175. See Petitioners’ Brief at 2–6, 10, supra note 128.
176. ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1205 (E.D. Cal. 2009); see also
Youn, supra note 151 (discussing how the exemption was originally intended to protect harassed
minority groups).
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made clear the Chamber’s intent to seize on this exemption when
ABC News pressed him on why the Chamber refused to open its
books regarding political contributions if it had nothing to hide.177
Josten pointed to the harassment that corporations like Target and
individuals like the supporters of Proposition 8 incurred. Using the
language of the Buckley/SWP exemption, he explained, “[The
Chamber is] not going to subject its contributors to harassment, to
intimidation, and to threats and to invasions of privacy at their
houses and at their places of business, which is what has happened
every time there’s been disclosure here.”178 It therefore appears that
opponents of disclosure are preparing for the day when their best or
only chance at remaining anonymous is to rely on the Buckley/SWP
exemption—an exemption that was previously available only to
minor parties. By failing to address this point in Doe, a case so
drastically different from Patterson and SWP, the Court has
unhooked this exemption from its theoretical moorings, signaling to
Major Political Players that they may continue to attempt to skirt
disclosure in this manner.
IV. THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT AS
“PROPER LEGAL MEANS”179:
WHY ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS SHOULD NOT
BE CONSIDERED HARASSMENT IN
CLAIMS FOR AS-APPLIED EXEMPTIONS
As Justice Kennedy stated in his majority opinion in Citizens
United v. FEC,180 “disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to
react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way.”181
Likewise, the economic boycott as a response to the speech of Major
Political Players is a “proper legal means” of voicing dissenting
opinions and the linchpin of why the boycott should therefore not be
used as a justification for exemption from generally applicable
disclosure rules. With the role of money in politics continuing to
177. Jake Tapper, Chamber of Commerce: The White House Wants Our Donor Lists So Its
Allies Can Intimidate Our Donors, ABC NEWS (Oct. 13, 2010, 11:10 AM),
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2010/10/chamber-of-commerce-the-white-house-wants-ourdonor-lists-so-its-allies-can-intimidate-our-donors/.
178. Id.
179. ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 1217.
180. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
181. Id. at 916 (emphasis added).
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increase and the 2012 election gearing up to be one of the most
contentious and expensive in history,182 one issue likely to arise with
greater frequency will be whether Major Political Players should be
held accountable for their election-related spending.
During the 2010 midterm elections, thirty-seven states decided
160 ballot initiatives, most of which tackled hot-button issues such as
the legalization of marijuana, affirmative action, abortion, and
prenatal rights.183 In the aftermath of New York’s passage of a samesex marriage bill, many expect other states to also place same-sex
marriage measures on the ballot in 2012.184 Recently, Minnesota185
announced that it would compel disclosure of corporate donors who
are involved in the movement to place an initiative on the 2012 ballot
that bans same-sex marriage, despite claims that the donors could
subsequently be subject to harassment.186
Because it is probable that the collective citizenry will use
economic boycotts to respond to some of these measures, one cannot
ignore or minimize the pressing need for a determination regarding
the lawfulness of this form of protest. Dissenting in Doe, Justice
Thomas bemoaned the “elusive” standard of the Buckley/SWP
exemption.187 He worried that the Court’s failure to articulate the
evidence that is required to sustain an as-applied challenge would
leave “a vacuum to be filled on a case-by-case basis. This will, no
doubt, result in the ‘drawing of’ arbitrary and ‘questionable’ ‘fine
distinctions’ by even the most well-intentioned district or circuit
182. The High Price of Anonymous Cash in American Political Campaigns, BLOOMBERG
(June 5, 2011, 9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-06/the-high-price-ofanonymous-cash-in-american-political-campaigns.html.
183. Voters to Decide on 160 Ballot Questions in 37 States, FOXNEWS.COM (Nov. 2, 2010),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/11/02/voters-decide-ballot-initiatives-states/.
184. Nate Silver, The Future of Same-Sex Marriage Ballot Measures, N.Y. TIMES
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT BLOG (June 29, 2011, 10:35 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/
2011/06/29/the-future-of-same-sex-marriage-ballot-measures/.
185. Minnesota was a political hotbed in 2010 for corporate donations to the socially
conservative PAC MN Forward. Minnesota was the main site for boycotts against Target and
Best Buy, which are both headquartered in the state. Other corporations based in Minnesota that
donated to MN Forward included 3M, Regis, Polaris, Securian, and Hubbard Broadcasting. Jim
Spencer, U.S. Chamber Fights Donation Disclosure Rules, STAR TRIBUNE (May 7, 2011,
5:21 PM), http://www.startribune.com/local/121409069.html.
186. Jillian Rayfield, NOM Loses Bid to Keep Anti-gay Marriage MN Donors Concealed out
of ‘Harassment’ Fears, TPM MUCKRAKER (July 6, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://tpmmuckraker.talking
pointsmemo.com/2011/07/nom_loses_bid_to_keep_anti-gay_marriage_mn_donors.php.
187. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2845 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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judge.”188 With no specific guidance from the Supreme Court as to
what constitutes harassment, lower courts are at risk of overcrowding
by those who seek to avoid disclosure by resorting to as-applied
challenges that are based on behavior that has enjoyed constitutional
protection for decades.
The question at issue is why economic boycotts are so important
as a protected First Amendment activity that the right to boycott
cannot be sacrificed. The answers lie in an examination of the
economic boycott’s role in advancing the core democratic principles
of promoting diverse viewpoints in the marketplace and encouraging
dissent. Both principles have long been considered fundamental to
the functioning of democratic institutions.
A. The Economic Boycott
in the Marketplace of Ideas
Historically, the exchange of competing ideas in the search for
truth has been one of the most important goals served by the First
Amendment, which is designed “to secure ‘the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources’”189 and “to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.”190 The Framers of the Constitution, the most distinguished
philosophers, and Supreme Court Justices have paid homage to the
idea that more speech, not less, increases discussion about issues of
public concern and therefore promotes the kind of free and open
debate that the First Amendment not only fosters but demands.191
Alexander Hamilton discussed the benefits of diverse opinions
when he urged that “differences of opinion, and the jarring of parties
in [the legislative] department of the government . . . often promote
deliberation and circumspection; and serve to check the excesses of

188. Id. (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 888 (2010)).
189. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (quoting Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
190. Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
191. See Charles Fried & Cliff Sloan, Free Speech Worth Paying for, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25,
2011, at A23.
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the majority.”192 The English philosopher John Stuart Mill, a
vigorous defender of free speech, echoed the same belief when he
railed against the “tyranny of the majority,” arguing that society must
safeguard minority views against the prevailing opinions of the
majority and that the free flow of ideas is a necessary condition of
progress and debate.193 To Mill, the “peculiar evil of silencing the
expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race.”194 It
was Mill’s embrace of the notion that unpopular ideas needed to be
heard—not to benefit the holder of the opinion, but for the benefit of
the greater society195—that influenced Oliver Wendell Holmes’
“marketplace of ideas” metaphor “that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market.”196 Justice Brandeis took the theory a step further when he
suggested that the remedy for speech that is threatening or
inconvenient is “more speech, not enforced silence.”197
Fast forward to Buckley and Citizens United, where the Court
construed the concept that “more speech is better”198 first to allow
unlimited expenditures by candidates199 and then to give corporations
unfettered influence in elections by allowing them to expend
unlimited sums of money to advocate for candidates.200 In Buckley,
the Court affirmed that “restrict[ing] speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment.”201 The argument that free speech
should not be restrained was also decisive in Citizens United, when
the Court struck down limits on corporate spending in elections,
holding that corporate political expenditures is a form of First

192. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 146 (2003) (alteration in original)
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 426–27 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
193. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 10–11 (1986).
194. Id. at 23.
195. Id. at 23–30.
196. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
197. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
198. See Richard L. Hasen, Rich Candidate Expected to Win Again, SLATE (Mar. 25, 2011,
7:08 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2289193/ (describing how the Court appears to apply the
“more speech is better” justification inconsistently).
199. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–15, 58–59 (1976).
200. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886, 896–99 (2010).
201. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49.
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Amendment–protected speech.202 Writing for the majority, Justice
Kennedy observed that “it is our law and our tradition that more
speech, not less, is the governing rule.”203 To the Court, if one of the
main goals of the First Amendment is to encourage as many points of
view as possible, the corporate identity of the speaker does not
justify a restriction on its right to speak.204
Given this line of precedents, coupled with cases that grant the
status of protected speech to economic boycotts, the Court should not
allow Major Political Players to use the fear of economic boycotts to
justify exemptions from disclosure requirements, because boycotts
inject more speech into the marketplace. Characterizing economic
boycotts as harassment would silence speech by impeding access to
the information that those who organize boycotts need. That, in turn,
would result in fewer diverse viewpoints entering the public arena
and the cessation of valuable public dialogue.
If the search for truth is a primary goal of the First Amendment,
it follows that “[a]ll viewpoints must have an equal opportunity to
compete in the intellectual marketplace, free from selective
governmental regulation.”205 The economic boycott is a way for the
weaker voices to be heard. If an individual disagrees with the way
the Koch brothers, George Soros, Target, or other individuals or
entities with vast financial resources and great access to tools of
communication choose to spend their money, she can do little about
it on her own. As the Court pointed out in Patterson, “Effective
advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly
controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association.”206
The very idea that a group of people object enough to the financing
of a candidate or message to band together for the purpose of making
their views known sends a strong message in itself.
Unequal wealth in this country has led to unequal political
influence. Major Political Players have the ability to hire lobbyists,
finance think tanks, and direct cash to groups with sympathetic
views. In the aftermath of Citizens United, if the Court extends a
202.
203.
204.
205.

Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
Id. at 911.
Id. at 912–13.
MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF
DEMOCRACY 102 (2001).
206. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
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right of anonymity to corporate speech by allowing economic
boycotts to serve as the basis of an exemption from disclosure, it
would “result in a debate that bears the imprint of those forces that
dominate the social structure.”207 The politically powerful would
effectively continue to receive a free pass to exert disproportionate
leverage over important social issues and political policy, thereby
further distorting social power by silencing opposing points of view
and impoverishing debate. As Justice Stevens argued in his dissent in
Citizens United, corporate political expenditures “on a scale few
natural persons can match” have the effect of “drowning out of
noncorporate voices.”208
I am not suggesting here the equality rationale that the Court
rejected in Buckley209 and Citizens United.210 The Buckley
admonishment against equalizing speech is consistent with the
Court’s rejection of the economic boycott as harassment. The Court
issued the admonishment in the context of striking down expenditure
limits as an infringement on core political speech. There is no
indication that this measure was intended to restrict citizens’ private
actions to hold such expenditures to a minimum or to hold businesses
accountable for such expenditures. Nor am I suggesting that the
government should be called on to “equalize” voices by increasing
its funding of disadvantaged parties, a concept that was squarely
rejected in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett.211 The economic boycott is a purely private action that the
Court should not regulate in the electoral context because doing so
would only serve to make it much more difficult for private citizens
to be heard at all.
207. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV 1405, 1412 (1986).
208. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 974 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
209. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (rejecting the government’s argument that
limiting independent expenditures would promote the government’s interest in “equalizing the
relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections”).
210. The equality rationale was first introduced in Buckley v. Valeo to justify limitations on
campaign expenditures. The government argued that limiting independent expenditures would
promote the government’s interest in “equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to
influence the outcome of elections.” Id. at 48. Most recently, the equality rationale was rejected in
Citizens United, in which the Court referred to this concept as the “antidistortion rationale.”
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the
Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 989 (2011) (discussing the role of the
equality rationale in campaign finance law).
211. 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2825–26 (2011).
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Finally, speakers—petition signers and donors to a ballot
initiative—are not the only group in the electoral process to whom
the First Amendment applies.212 Protecting the right of the listener to
receive information and respond accordingly is fundamental to the
concept of uninhibited discourse and debate: inherent in the idea of a
debate is that at least two sides are exchanging ideas. If a business is
going to make a campaign donation or organize support for a ballot
initiative, then it must be prepared to deal with any lawful
ramifications, including economic boycotts. In this context, the
economic boycott is a constitutionally protected, organized response
by consumers to constitutionally protected electoral “speech” by the
businesses that they are boycotting. Allowing Major Political Players
to rely on threats of economic boycotts as a justification for
exemptions from disclosure in this context would victimize the
listener by removing his ability to respond in the most effective
manner.
B. Dissent and First Amendment Protection:
Speaking Truth to Power213
In Doe, the Court cited the fear of economic boycotts as
evidence of harassment that could justify exemptions from
disclosure. But allowing this claim would defy one of the primary
goals of the First Amendment—enabling dissent—and would do so
in the most critical aspect of democracy: the electoral process. While
the marketplace-of-ideas metaphor allows more speakers,
viewpoints, and opinions to join the conversation in a search for
truth, the value of dissent is premised on the idea that criticism is

212. See Note, Overbreadth and Listeners’ Rights, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1761–66 (2010)
(examining the Supreme Court’s treatment of the right to open discourse); see also Leading
Cases, Freedom of Speech and Expression—Public Disclosure of Referendum Petitions, 124
HARV. L. REV. 269, 276 (2010) (“[A]udience interests must be given preeminent weight in cases
of explicitly political debate because the paramount concern here is that citizens be able to make
wise, well-informed choices about matters of shared public concern.” (quoting Paul G. Stern, A
Pluralistic Reading of the First Amendment and Its Relation to Public Discourse, 99 YALE L.J.
925, 939 (1990))).
213. Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1746–47 (2005)
(explaining that the conventional understanding of dissent is that dissenters “speak truth to
power” by either attempting to persuade the majority or merely speaking critically of the state).
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crucial to promoting a better democracy and assisting with selfgovernance.214
In discussing the economic boycott in Claiborne Hardware, the
Court emphasized the need for debate on public issues and deferred
to the idea that “expression on public issues ‘has always rested on the
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.’”215
“[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is
the essence of self-government.”216 In one of his many essays
examining the relationship between self-government and free speech,
Alexander Meiklejohn wrote,
[C]onflicting views may be expressed, must be expressed,
not because they are valid, but because they are relevant. If
they are responsibly entertained by anyone, we, the voters,
need to hear them . . . . To be afraid of ideas, any idea, is to
be unfit for self government.217
Cass Sunstein has argued that “at its core, [free speech] is designed
to protect political disagreement and dissent.”218 In the electoral
context, economic boycotts accomplish these objectives by
challenging the status quo through active protest. They call attention
to political behavior that might otherwise go unnoticed, and they
hold parties accountable for their political activities, thereby
promoting a more stable democracy.
Just as flag burning and antiwar protests are considered
protected speech because of their value as expressions of dissent, the
economic boycott has a similar value in the electoral process: all of
these activities are geared at changing social or political
viewpoints.219 First Amendment scholar Steven Shiffrin, who defines
dissent as “speech that criticizes existing customs, habits, traditions,

214. SUNSTEIN, supra note 192, at 98; see also, ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH
ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 36–37 (Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2000) (1948)
(explaining that if legislators, judges, and the public did not have the right to criticize government
policy, “the whole program of representative self-government would be broken down”).
215. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (quoting Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).
216. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
217. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 214, at 27.
218. SUNSTEIN, supra note 192, at 98.
219. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 96–100
(1990).
AND
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institutions, or authorities,”220 theorizes that “[t]he political bias of a
dissent-centered conception of the First Amendment is for those who
wish to challenge the status quo and for those who believe that
society stagnates and furthers injustice when it is not open to
challenge.”221 In this regard, the boycotters are speaking critically to
those with more powerful economic voices; they are “speaking truth
to power.” Their message is no different from messages that
lobbyists deliver: if we agree with what you are doing, we will
support you financially; if we disagree, we will withdraw our
support. For that matter, the boycotters’ message is simply the
inverse of that of the Major Political Players. Whereas the Major
Political Players use their financial power to support a proposed
governmental policy or candidate with which or whom they agree,
the boycotters withhold their financial support to show that they
disagree with these players. Both the Major Political Players and the
boycotters use their economic clout to influence decision making. If,
as Shiffrin posits, certain social beliefs may “more likely be
testimony to . . . the interests of those in power than to their
‘truth,’”222 then the “clashing of opinions”223 is critical to allow the
citizenry to make the best decisions possible.
Likewise, economic boycotts in the electoral process attempt to
influence decision making by forcing valuable information about
their targets into the sunlight.224 If, as Justice Brennan stated, the
right of the collective citizenry to engage in “uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open” debate is inherent in the doctrine of free speech in a
democracy,225 then citizens must have access to as much information
as possible.226 In the case of campaign donations or ballot initiatives,
this information would include the identification of the sponsor or
sponsors of the speech, so that voters can adequately assess a
sponsor’s motivation.227 Disclosure ensures that interested parties get
220. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA xi (2000).
221. Id. at 129.
222. Id. at 92.
223. SUNSTEIN, supra note 192, at 146.
224. See Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WEEKLY, Dec. 20, 1913, at
10 (“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”).
225. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
226. See Leading Cases, supra note 212, at 276.
227. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66–67 (1976) (explaining that disclosure regarding
campaign contributions provides the public with information needed to evaluate candidates).
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this information;228 economic boycotts ensure that the information
will be thrust into the public eye.229
Additionally, economic boycotts inform the business being
boycotted that not only does a segment of the community disagree
with its political activity but the segment holds the business
accountable for its actions. The boycott of Target demonstrates the
effectiveness of the economic boycott in forcing a corporation to
make changes in its political policies and donations.230 Within three
weeks of learning of the company’s donation to MN Forward, nearly
62,000 people became fans of a Facebook group urging users to
boycott Target.231 A YouTube video featuring a Target customer with
a gay son became extremely popular, with almost 200,000 views by
the beginning of August.232 As a result, in early 2011, Target
announced that it had adopted new guidelines for making political
donations, including the establishment of a new policy committee
that would oversee the company’s political activities and be
responsible for “balancing [its] business interests and other
considerations that may be important to [its] team members, guests
or other stakeholders.”233 The Target boycott also influenced an
investor in another major company to propose a shareholderprotection initiative.234 NorthStar Asset Management, an investment
firm that owns shares of Home Depot, took notice of the $1.3 billion
loss that Target faced immediately after its donation in August
2010.235 Fearing a similar backlash to Home Depot’s political
228. Cf. id.
229. Brandeis, supra, note 224, at 10.
230. See Jennifer Martinez & Tom Hamburger, Target Faces Investor Backlash, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 2010, at A1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/19/nation/la-na-targetshareholders-20100820.
231. Steve Karnowski, Target Pulls Olive Branch to Gay Rights Group, MSNBC (Aug. 16,
2010, 7:02 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38729241/ns/business-consumer_news/.
232. Doug Grow, Meet the Woman Fighting Target’s Anti-gay Donation, SALON.COM
(Aug. 3, 2010, 4:01 PM), http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2010/08/03/randi_reitan_atrget.
The video—which follows a woman into a Target store where she purchases items only to
immediately return them, cuts up her Target credit card in front of the employees, and explains
why she will no longer patronize the chain—also aired on Countdown with Keith Olbermann.
233. Civic Activity, TARGET.COM, http://hereforgood.target.com/learn-more/civic-activity/
(last visited Sept. 7, 2011); accord Editorial, Target’s Turnaround, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2011, at
A14.
234. Andy Kroll, Citizens United: The Shareholders Strike Back, MOTHER JONES (June 1,
2011, 3:00 AM), http://motherjones.com/politics/2011/05/citizens-united-home-depot-elections.
235. Id.
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spending, the fund introduced a shareholder resolution that would
force Home Depot to disclose all political donations.236 While Home
Depot’s management rejected the resolution, proponents of
disclosure lauded the move as a “good first step” toward raising
awareness and demanding change.237
The economic boycott is also a necessary recourse that the
public takes when the government has become unresponsive to the
will of the people. Despite the fact that a large, bipartisan majority of
the public disagrees with the holding in Citizens United,238 it is now
the law of the land. To date, due to partisan disagreement,239
Congress has been unwilling or unable to close the floodgates of
corporate money flowing into elections. As a result, the economic
boycott is becoming one of the few ways in which people can voice
their disapproval of this specific law and policy while they
subsequently send a public message of dissatisfaction to elected
officials that the representatives must pass legislation or “fix” the
problem in another way.
The economic boycott as a tool of dissent must also be protected
because it promotes political stability. When dissenters, boycotters,
or dissidents voice their views outside of a Target or Best Buy or
organize an Internet campaign to boycott a business, they do not
always expect to effect change; sometimes they are just “letting off
steam.” By taking action and making their voices heard, they are
expressing their rejection of the current state of affairs and forcing
their views into the political discourse, engaging in participatory
democracy. In nondemocratic societies, dissent is more likely to be
suppressed, “driv[ing] opposition underground, leaving those
suppressed either apathetic or desperate. [Suppression] thus saps the

236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majorities Opposes Supreme Court Decision on Campaign
Financing, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2010, 4:38 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151_pf.html (85 percent of Democrats, 76 percent
of Republicans, and 80 percent of all respondents “oppose” Citizens United, and 65 percent of
respondents “strongly oppose” the ruling); see PUB. CITIZEN, 12 MONTHS AFTER: THE EFFECT
OF CITIZENS UNITED ON ELECTIONS AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 17–31
(Jan. 2011), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Citizens-United-20110113.pdf.
239. Michael Waldman, Why Is GOP Fighting Disclosure?, POLITICO (June 10, 2011,
10:08 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0611/56693.html.
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vitality of the society and makes resort to force more likely.”240 In
exchange for our privilege of self-governance, “we agree to accept
the results of the self-governing process, even if our idea is
rejected.”241 It is our right to dissent, but it is our responsibility to
give deference to the process that ensures this right.
Finally, Shiffrin theorizes that in a democracy “it is not enough
to tolerate dissent; dissent needs to be institutionally encouraged.”242
He posits that one of the conditions for encouraging dissent is
holding legal barriers to a minimum.243 In keeping with this idea, the
Court should promote dissent by insisting on disclosure and rejecting
the Major Political Players’ claims that economic boycotts are
harassment.
C. Balancing the Equities
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has been the most outspoken
opponent of disclosure for corporations.244 Its logic has remained
consistent: if you force our association and similar groups or
businesses to disclose, then we will be vulnerable to retaliation, and
you will risk chilling our speech and hurting society as a whole.245
The Chamber claims that compelled disclosure will result in
harassment such as economic boycotts, citing the Target example as
a reason why President Obama must not sign the proposed executive
order that would require strict federal disclosure rules for
government contractors.246 But if economic boycotts are protected
First Amendment speech, and the Court has adhered to a long line of
precedent that gives priority to more speech in the marketplace, why
would the Court undermine the value of economic boycotts as
expressive activity by allowing them to be deemed harassment and
grounds for exemptions from disclosure? The answer would have to
rest in a determination by the Court that, on balance, the harm that
240. Thomas Emerson, Toward a General Theory of First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 884
(1963).
241. Introduction to FRANK LOWENSTEIN ET AL., VOICES OF PROTEST: DOCUMENTS OF
COURAGE AND DISSENT 16 (Frank Lowenstein et al. eds, 2007).
242. SHIFFRIN, supra note 220, at xiii.
243. Id. at 112–13.
244. See supra Part III.B.3.
245. See supra Part III.B.3.
246. Eric Lichtblau, Lobbyist Fires Warning Shot over Donation Disclosure Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 26, 2011, at A17.
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disclosure causes, either in terms of its chilling effect on political
activity or infringing on rights of privacy, outweighs the state
interests that such disclosure serves. A plethora of scholarship has
been devoted to this subject, but here I will attempt to analyze why I
believe that, in the case of Major Political Players, the value of
economic boycotts trumps either of the so-called harms that they
may inflict.
The petitioners in both ProtectMarriage.com and Doe v. Reed
argued that disclosure would undermine participation in the political
process. As discussed above, Justice Alito was convinced that this
was true in Doe, concluding that “[t]he widespread harassment and
intimidation suffered by supporters of California’s Proposition 8
provides strong support for an as-applied exemption in the present
case.”247 Admittedly, instances of individuals who contribute small
amounts to campaigns or ballot initiatives and as a result suffer
retaliation in the form of economic boycotts give rise to troubling
questions.248 This was the case for Marjorie Christofferson, whose
family owns the popular Los Angeles restaurant El Coyote, and who
donated $100 in 2008 to support the passage of Proposition 8.249
After Christofferson’s contribution was publicly disclosed,
opponents of Proposition 8 relied on the Internet to quickly organize
boycotts of the restaurant and discredit it in an effort to discourage
people from patronizing it.250 Business declined more than
30 percent, forcing management to cut employees’ hours and close
the restaurant at lunch.251 The Court cited instances such as this in
both ProtectMarriage.com and Doe.252
It is difficult to argue that small donors or ordinary signatories to
ballot initiatives individually pose a compelling need for disclosure
247. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2823 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring).
248. See Brad Stone, Prop 8 Donor Web Site Shows Disclosure Law Is 2-Edged Sword, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 8, 2009, at B3; see generally Briffault, supra note 21, at 275 (discussing harassment
of those who made contributions to Prop. 8 campaign).
249. Steve Lopez, Prop 8 Stance Upends Her Life, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2008, at B1; see
supra Part II.D.
250. Tami Abdollah & Cara Mia DiMassa, Prop. 8 Foes Shift Attention, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14,
2008, at A1.
251. Lopez, supra note 249.
252. See ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d. 1197 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (detailing
specific instances of harassment of Prop. 8 supporters); see also Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2820
(acknowledging that public disclosure of campaign contributions can lead to intimidation and
harassment).
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when the harm to them can be very great and the benefit to society of
knowing their identities is quite miniscule in terms of advancing any
substantial state interests. In these cases, disclosure does not help the
public identify or evaluate the special interests that are trying to
influence an election, nor does it help the public better understand
the motivations of these parties. Instead, for a regular individual such
as Christofferson who works at or owns a small business, disclosure
could lead to a boycott that has the potential to be catastrophic,
decimating the business and stripping the individual of her
livelihood. Threats of boycotts in these situations could clearly
discourage political involvement, thus stifling First Amendment
objectives. To avoid this possibility, one suggestion that appears to
have gained traction is that both the federal and state governments
could raise the financial threshold that is applicable to compelled
disclosure.253 Currently, federal law mandates disclosure for
donations of $200 or more, and many state laws have threshold
requirements as low as $20–$100.254 This would address the privacy
and harassment concerns by automatically exempting ordinary, small
donors.
But one should not conflate the impact that economic boycotts
can have on regular individuals with their impact on Major Political
Players, such as Target or a business that the Koch brothers own,
which are far better situated to withstand any potential economic
pressure. A higher monetary threshold for disclosures would isolate
these wealthier donors, whose contributions have a greater impact
and whose motives should be more closely scrutinized. When “big
fish” are allowed to go unchecked in their quest to avoid disclosure,
they are able to exert undue influence in the electoral process. The
unrestricted dollars that Major Political Players contribute to the
coffers of issue groups or candidates have exacerbated this

253. For further discussion, see Briffault, supra note 21, at 300–02; see also William
McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Persona: Bringing Privacy Theory to Election Law, 19 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 859, 881–82 (2010–2011) (discussing raising thresholds for “big fish” and
other methods to advance disclosure goals); E. Rebecca Gantt, Note, Toward Recognition of a
Monetary Threshold in Campaign Finance Disclosure Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 385, 418–25 (2011)
(arguing for a substantive monetary threshold).
254. See Briffault, supra note 106, at 1003–04 (citing ProtectMarriage.com, 599 F. Supp. 2d
at 1221 n.10.
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problem.255 For example, last November three oil companies
contributed more than $8 million to support Proposition 23 in
California, which sought to suspend existing and proposed
regulations to address global warming,256 and which would have
directly benefitted the companies’ businesses if it had been
successful. Further emboldened by the ruling in Citizens United,
corporations and independent associations representing special
interests spent upward of $305 million in the 2010 elections,257 and
large corporations, such as Prudential Financial, Dow Chemical,
Goldman Sachs, and Chevron Texaco, were among those that
contributed more than $1 million to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
to support various issue campaigns.258
Compounding these large expenditures has been the trend of
Major Political Players concealing their identities and thus
attempting to avoid accountability for their actions259 by funneling
their money through third-party, nonprofit PACs that are organized
under section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.260 If the Court
allows these organizations to continue in this manner, Major Political
Players will continue to influence elections and campaigns while
they remain hidden from the public eye. This secrecy poses a serious
threat to the decision-making ability of the electorate, who have a
right to know who is supporting a political cause and who would
stand to benefit from the outcome. Even scholars who argue in favor
of affording more weight to privacy and anonymity in this process
acknowledge the “importance of scale”261 and recognize the value

255. See PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 238 (situating Citizens United in the history of spending in
the political process and discussing the explosion in corporate spending post-Citizens United).
256. Margot Roosevelt, Billionaire Koch Brothers Back Suspension of California Climate
Law, L.A. TIMES BLOG (Sept. 2, 2010, 11:16 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/greenspace/
2010/09/koch-brothers-global-warming-prop-23-climate-change.html.
257. J. Crewdson et al., Secret Donors Multiply in U.S. Election Spending, BLOOMBERG
(May 19, 2011, 3:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-19/secret-donors-multiplyin-u-s-with-finances-dwarfing-watergate.html.
258. Eric Lipton, et al., Top Corporations Aid U.S. Chamber of Commerce Campaign, N.Y
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2010, at A1.
259. Hasen, supra note 106; see Michael Luo & Stephanie Strom, Donor Names Remain
Secret as Rules Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2010, at A1.
260. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2006) (allowing organizations to accept unlimited donations while
not requiring disclosure of their donors so long as their “primary purpose” is not to influence
elections); see Luo & Strom, supra note 259.
261. McGeveran, supra note 253, at 880.
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that is gleaned by exposing these groups, whose “large donations . . .
effectively bankroll a candidate or ballot initiative.”262
This argument of scale can also be used to distinguish the
Court’s upholding of anonymity in McIntyre while rejecting it in
Doe. In McIntyre, the speech of one individual might have been
silenced if she had been forced to identify herself.263 Major Political
Players can and do make the same argument that compelled
disclosure will chill their speech. On balance, however, large
corporations and wealthy individuals are far better equipped to
defend themselves against the consequences of their participation in
the process, and I argue that the right of the electorate to know about
large donations outweighs any such claim that Major Political
Players might make. First, the state’s interest in informing voters of
who is supporting candidates or initiatives is far more compelling in
light of the political clout that Major Political Players wield, and the
economic boycott is an effective tool for exposing and criticizing
those with disproportionately powerful voices. Second, in situations
where Major Political Players are supporting a view that the general
public commonly holds, which was the case in both
ProtectMarriage.com and Doe, reliance on a harassment claim that is
historically reserved for minor parties is disingenuous at best. Third,
the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to be free of
criticism for speech. If Major Political Players inject themselves into
the political process in ways that can influence entire elections, they
must exhibit “civic courage” and be willing to face the consequences
of their actions. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his concurring
opinion in Doe, “The right [of freedom of speech] . . . is the right to
speak, not the right to speak . . . anonymously.”264

262. Id.
263. See supra notes 78–86 and accompanying text.
264. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2831 n.4 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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V. CONCLUSION
This Note has the limited goal of exploring a question that the
Supreme Court has not answered: can Major Political Players that
have made large donations or lent organized support to ballot
initiatives use threats of economic boycotts, which are protected First
Amendment activity, as justification for exemptions from disclosure?
As a result of Citizens United, Americans go into the 2012 voting
cycle facing unlimited campaign spending on ads that were paid for
by PACs and nonprofits about whom we will know little other than
the name that they use for advertising. Voters will be making
decisions on critical issues, including the election of a president,
“knowing less about those trying to shape their views . . . than they
have since secret money helped finance the Watergate burglary and
re-elect President Richard Nixon in 1972.”265 Data from the Center
for Responsive Politics show that outside conservative and
overwhelmingly Republican organizations outspent liberal,
Democrat-leaning groups by about two to one in general, and by
seven to one when donors were kept secret.266
There has been plenty of push back from the Democratic Obama
administration in an effort to curtail the effects of Citizens United. In
March 2011, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission agreed
with NorthStar Asset Management, a Home Depot shareholder, that
Home Depot must include on its ballot a proposal requiring the board
to disclose its policies on electioneering contributions and consult
with its shareholders on such policies.267 This was a sharp reversal of
existing corporate law rules, which had previously considered
corporate political speech decisions as ordinary business decisions
that did not require input from shareholders.268 In April 2011, a draft
executive order was leaked; it required any government contractor to
disclose political contributions exceeding $5,000 that its executives
made to organizations that engage in political advertising, including

265. Crewdson et al., supra 257.
266. Id.
267. Robert J. Jackson, Jr., SEC Strengthens Shareholders’ Role in Corporate Political
Speech Decisions, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 15, 2011,
11:04 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/05/15/sec-strengthens-shareholders%E2%
80%99-role-in-corporate-political-speech-decisions/.
268. Id.
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501(c) organizations and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.269 In May
2011, it became known that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) sent
letters to five donors to nonprofit advocacy groups that were
organized under section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code; the
letters stated that the donors could be liable for gift taxes on their
donations.270 The IRS dropped that effort in July 2011 under pressure
from conservative groups, who argued that the decision to audit
those donors was politically motivated and potentially in violation of
the First Amendment.271 A Wall Street Journal op-ed denounced the
leaked executive order as an effort to “veto the Supreme Court”
decision in Citizens United and to “suppress corporate political
activity,” invoking the Patterson decision and its warning of the
potential for economic retaliation, and also pointing to the
harassment that supporters of Proposition 8 faced.272 “[I]f the
president succeeds in reducing the free-speech rights of business
today, it will be far easier to limit the same rights of other Americans
tomorrow,” the op-ed threatened.273 But none of these “remedies” are
aimed at individuals like Margaret McIntyre or Marjorie
Christofferson. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that the
businesses that complain about forced disclosure are, for the most
part, Fortune 500 companies that are looking to influence elections
and campaigns while they stay hidden from the public eye and
insulated from any consequences.
In a society that has become increasingly politically polarized, it
is imperative that the Supreme Court set guideposts for the battles to
come over the use of the economic boycott in the electoral process.
If, in fact, our elections are to be fair and open, and if they are to
embody the historically enunciated First Amendment goals
encouraging free speech and open debate, the Court should take an
active role both in determining what activity constitutes harassment
and in curtailing claims that do not merit that designation. While the

269. See David Marston & John Yoo, Political Privacy Should Be a Civil Right, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 27, 2011, at A17.
270. Stephanie Strom, I.R.S. Drops Audits of Political Donors, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2011, at
B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/business/irs-drops-audits-of-donors-topolitical-groups.html?_r=1&ref=politics.
271. Id.
272. Marston & Yoo, supra note 269.
273. Id.
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Court’s embrace of compelled disclosure in both Citizens United and
Doe indicates its willingness to increase the information that is
available to the electorate, the Court must now go one step further: it
must preclude Major Political Players from impeding the right of the
citizenry to engage in economic boycotts by turning such activity
into claims for harassment.274

274. Shortly before this Note went to press, two district courts held in Doe v. Reed, No. C095456BHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119814 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 17, 2011), and in
ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, No. 2:09-cv-00058-MCE-DAD, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128229
(E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2011), that plaintiffs’ evidence of harassment was insufficient to justify
exemptions to the disclosure of the petition signers’ and the contributors’ identities, respectively.
Doe, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119814, at *49–50; ProtectMarriage.com, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
128229, at *106–10. As a result, the courts in both cases denied summary judgment for the
plaintiffs. Doe, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119814, at *51; ProtectMarriage.com, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 128229, at *110. These holdings are consistent with the thesis of this Note, although they
do not directly discuss the issue of economic boycotts as First Amendment activity. Also just
before publication, I became aware of two recent articles that cover some of the same territory
that the reader may be interested in. Richard Briffault, Two Challenges for Campaign Finance
Disclosure After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 983 (2011);
Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Has the Tide Turned in Favor of Disclosure? Revealing Money in Politics
After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1057 (2011).

